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Abstract. Payment for environmental service (PES) is commonly defined as a market-based environmental 
policy instrument to efficiently achieve environmental protection. However, an increasing body of literature 
shows that the prescriptive conceptualization of PES cannot be easily generalized and implemented in 
practice and the commoditization of ecosystem services is problematic and may be unfair. To investigate the 
underlying causes, this study combined a quantitative and qualitative research approach using case studies in 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Nepal. The empirical observations on emerging PES-mechanisms in the Asian 
case studies show that interdependency of fairness and efficiency should be the main consideration in 
designing and implementing a PES scheme in developing countries. 
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Asia’s landscape, where most of its inhabitants depend on 
agriculture and natural resources for their livelihood, has an 
immense diversity of land-cover mosaics. This region 
offers many opportunities to explore interactions between 
environmental services (ES) and land use practices by its 
farmers. These farmers mostly act as land managers who 
have a meagre living in the upper watershed and at the 
forest boundary. These areas provide many valuable ES 
and at the same time are mostly under severe threat of 
degradation (MA 2005). Market imperfection and policy 
distortion that neglect the social and economic importance 
of ecosystems are claimed as root causes for environmental 
problems in Asia (Tomich et al. 2004; TEEB 2010)   
The principle of market-based instruments is applied 
for capturing the financial value of ecosystem services 
through monetization and commoditization of ecosystem 
services (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010) of which payment 
for environmental services (PES) is an important 
component. Initial debates on PES focused on the quest of 
enhancing economic efficiency of conservation and 
enforcing markets to link supply and demand for ecosystem 
services. The main reason for the application of market-
based instruments for ecosystem services is because the 
real value of ecosystem services to human wellbeing is not, 
or only partially included in market economics (De Groot 
1992; Turner et al. 1994; Costanza et al. 1997).  This 
situation refers to market failures, i.e. the failure of markets 
to reflect to full or true value of so-called free services such 
as pure water (without the need for purification) or 
pollination enhancing crop yields, and neglect to recognize 
negative effects of economic activities on  environmental  
 
public goods (i.e. so called negative externalities).  The 
articulation of market forces in solving these negative 
externalities aims to transfer external values to local 
decision makers in providing such environmental services 
at the lowest possible social cost. 
Effective legal structures with well-defined and 
enforceable policy rights can overcome the problems of 
market failures associated with environmental externalities 
(Coase 1960). Schemes with voluntary contracts as 
opposed to strict command-and-control instruments may 
better approximate social optimum and increase efficiency 
in generating environmental goods and services.  
A valid line of argument on PES exists among 
scientists and practitioners that a PES instrument should not 
be burdened by additional social equity goals in achieving 
its environmental and cost-effectiveness goals of ES 
provisions. The question is what environmental integrity 
aspects can be segregated from social inequity issues? 
Nevertheless, recent literature discussed that the Coasean 
and pure market approach dominating the conceptualization 
of PES cannot be easily generalized and implemented in 
practice (Muradian et al. 2010).  
Moreover, Kosoy and Corbera (2010) through the lens 
of “commodity fetishism” argued the commoditization of 
ecosystem services was problematic. Case studies in Latin 
America showed social values beyond merely financial 
payment induced participation in PES (Kosoy et al. 2007) 
and monetization of environmental services was mostly 
rejected by the PES recipients (Asquith et al. 2008). 
However, potential combination between equity and 
efficiency may be possible (Pascual et al. 2010). Thus, 
there is a clear need to adjust Coarse’s argument and 
1This paper is a summary of main findings from: Leimona B (2011) Fairly efficient or efficiently fair: success factors and constraints of 
payment and reward schemes for environmental services in Asia. PhD Thesis. Wageningen University and Research. The Netherlands.  
http://www.worldagroforestrycentre.org/sea/Publications/files/thesis/TD0166-11/TD0166-11-1.PDF. Presented in the International 
Grassland Conference, Sydney, 16 September 2013.   
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incorporate context and perspective of local stakeholders. 
Especially, when PES schemes are applied in developing 
countries with skewed wealth distribution, contested 
property rights, low law enforcement and weak institutions 
(Neef and Thomas 2009).  
Supported by global agreements, the solution of 
environmental problems in developing countries, 
specifically in Asia have to emphasize dual goals of 
poverty alleviation and environmental conservation 
(Tinbergen 1976; UN 1992). Payment for Environmental 
Services (PES) is one of the tools currently being tested and 
practiced globally to help achieve these goals (Muradian et 
al. 2010; Pascual et al. 2010; Van Noordwijk and Leimona 
2010). The PES-concept was initially strictly defined as a 
market-based environmental policy instrument to achieve 
environmental protection in the most efficient way (Pagiola 
et al. 2005; Engel et al. 2008). This is based on the 
principle “you get what you pay” for positive effects on the 
flow of environmental services (Wunder,2007). However, 
recent literature discussed that the Coasean and pure market 
approach dominating the conceptualization of PES cannot 
be easily generalized and implemented in practice 
(Muradian et al. 2010).  
The conceptualization and analysis of PES in Asian 
countries is still limitedly analyzed how to balance between 
efficiency and fairness involved in changing current land 
use, socio-cultural values and behaviour of relevant stake-
holders. Based on empirical research in Indonesia, Philip-
pines and Nepal, this study aims to test the overarching 
hypothesis that without combining efficiency and fairness 
aspects, the PES concept will not provide sustainable 
solutions and its implementation may achieve neither an 
increase of ES provision nor livelihood enhancement.  
This paper presents an analysis of practical applications 
of PES in Asian developing countries. It shows that in 
order for PES to achieve its dual goals, the emphasis to 
inclusion of both efficiency and fairness elements to all 
actors involved is essential. This study briefly describes the 
obstacles to, and conditions for, establishing PES in 
developing country contexts. The research investigated the 
need for broader categorization of PES conditionality and 
perspectives to meet imperfect conditions for applying 
strict ES market-based policies in developing countries. 
Observed imperfect conditions are among others: insecure 
property rights, high incidence of poverty, poor enviro-
nmental governance, and high potential conflict in natural 
resource management. This paper suggests some solutions 
on how to design a pro-poor PES based on an analysis of 
circumstances where PES can contribute to income 
increment, observed preferred rewards and PES outcomes 
to ES providers. The findings also include the application 
of multiple ecological-knowledge to improve PES 
efficiency and fairness.  
The context of Asian landscape and people 
In Asian rural areas, traditional land and resource manage-
ment systems fail as population increases and 
miniaturization of land leads to overuse. Skewed land 
distribution often compels the poor to survive by 
cultivating marginal land – erosion- prone slopes and other 
environmental problems. Without tenure, and often with 
only passing claims on the land they cultivate, the poor are 
less likely to make investments to protect natural resources 
(Brandon and Ramankutty 1993; Van Noordwijk et al. 
2002). These socioeconomic conditions are apparent on 
research areas of this study.  
The pilot sites where the author coordinated and 
conducted research for this study cover three countries 
(Indonesia, the Philippines and Nepal) and nine sites 
located in Southeast and South Asia (Fig. 1). Following the 
analysis of Hadi and van Noordwijk (2005), some 
combinations of agro ecological zones can be distinguished 
from these sites for analyzing potential establishment of 
rewards for environmental services (RES) through the 
interaction of tree-based and more intensive agriculture or 
urban land use system. For example, RES is potentially 
operational for watershed functions in Sumatra – Indonesia, 
Luzon and Mindanao – the Philippines, and some parts of 
South Asia, where lowland rice is located at the 
downstream of upland mosaic, forest, or tree-crop mixed, 
or in some parts of South Asia, where ‘highland mixed’ is 
located at the upstream of urbanized areas. Rewards for 
biodiversity conservation can occur where tree-crop or 
upland mosaic is located adjacent to forest threatened by 
further expansions of intensive anthropocentric land use.  
Furthermore, the sites are action and learning sites of 
the Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental Services 
(RUPES) project of World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) 
Southeast Asia Region, which are the pioneers of RES 
initiative in each of the three countries. Indonesia and the 
Philippines were selected to represent the Southeast Asia 
region, where natural resource management is growing in 
practice (CGIAR, 2011) and where ICRAF’s “sentinel 
landscapes” exist to provide collection of the long-term 
data sets and to test models. Nepal was included as a case 
study in South Asia, where collective action and social 
movement are relatively advanced, especially in its upland 
area. Figure 1 shows that analysis at local level was mostly 
conducted in Indonesia, while the case studies in the 
Philippines and Nepal provide lessons at the regional level.  
Most of the sites focus on rewards for watershed 
services under private and public schemes (Table 1). Two 
of pilot sites (Singkarak, Indonesia and Kalahan, the 
Philippines) are testing the voluntary carbon market and 
one of the sites (Bungo, Indonesia) is seeking opportunities 
for eco-certification scheme of rubber agroforestry. The 
stages of implementations are also various, ranging from 
initial development of RES, where the intermediary 
partners are conducting scoping studies on biophysical and 
socioeconomic aspects of the pilot, to mature schemes, 
where contractual agreements have been signed and 
schemes are ready to be scaled up.  
Main findings 
Broader categorization of conditionality of PES 
emphasizes interdependency between fairness and 
efficiency as opposed to a strict and prescriptive PES 
definition 
The    current    PES    definition    reflects    the    Coasean  
Payment for environmental services 
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Figure 1. Research sites in Asia with pilot-level research conducted in Indonesia. 
 
Table 1. Research sites and the status of the applied ‘rewards for environmental service’ scheme. 
Site Started in Main ES Scheme Status 
Indonesia 
Singkarak, West 
Sumatra  
2002 Watershed services 
 
Distribution of royalty of a 
parastatal hydroelectric power 
(HEP) company 
Ad-hoc share of royalty 
 
  Carbon sequestration (voluntary)  Financial payment from an 
international carbon broker 
Agreed 10 year contract in total 
49 hectares 
Bungo, Jambi 2002 Agrobiodiversity conservation of 
jungle rubber  
Financial payment from a 
philanthropic scheme   
Ad-hoc reward of a micro hydro  
   Eco-certification for jungle 
rubber  
Scoping elements for RES 
development 
Sumberjaya, Lampung 2002 Watershed services, mainly 
sedimentation reduction  
‘Conditional CSR’ from a 
parastatal HEP company  
Agreed 1 year contract and 
scaled up to other sites 
Cidanau, West Java 2001 Watershed services for domestic 
and industrial demands 
‘Conditional CSR’ from a water 
company  
Agreed 5 year-contracts in xx 
villages 
Kapuas Hulu, West 
Kalimatan 
2008 Watershed services for a district 
water company  
Earmark payment from water bill  Scoping elements for RES 
development  
Talau, East Nusa 
Tenggara 
2008 Watershed services for a district 
water company  
Earmark payment from water bill Scoping elements for RES 
development 
The Philippines  
Bakun  2004 Watershed services for private 
HEPs 
Distribution of HEP’s royalty to 
community  
Agreed share of royalty  
Kalahan  2002 Carbon sequestration (voluntary)  Financial payment from national 
companies  
Initial negotiation with potential 
buyers 
Nepal 
Kulekhani 2002 Watershed services for a private 
HEP 
Distribution of HEP’s royalty to 
community  
Agreed share of royalty 
 
conceptualization of PES i.e. efficiency gains may be 
achieved independent of the allocation of property rights 
(Bulte et al. 2008; Zilberman et al. 2008; Neef and Thomas 
2009; Muradian et al. 2010). The concept also disregards 
equity issues since the aggregate gains and losses by 
different economic agents is more important than how they 
are distributed in society (Pascual et al. 2010). The ideal 
PES schemes based on environmental and cost efficiency 
principle should “integrate environmental services21
                                                     
12 In their article, Farley and Costanza (2010) used the term 
“ecosystem services” rather than “environmental services”.  
into 
markets, and should be like any other market transaction” 
(Farley and Costanza 2010). Further, the inclusion of a 
poverty alleviation goal might reduce economic efficiency 
of the scheme (Pagiola et al. 2005; Wunder et al. 2008). 
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Practices in developing countries mostly rule out PES if 
this definition is strictly applied as a market-based or 
commoditized ES.   
Our case studies proved that precondition for the 
Coasean conceptualization of PES could not be met. The 
reasons, among others, were lack of data and capability to 
measure, map, model, value and monitor ecosystem 
services at multiple scales; unclear property rights; lack of 
sustainable funding; and close links between poverty and 
environmental degradation. In addition to that, the Asian 
cases mostly placed ES providers as more marginalized 
community group with low formal education background 
and lack of access to information and justice. Our result 
aligned with the Heredia Declaration of Payments for 
Ecosystem Services introduced by an article by Farley and 
Costanza (2010). The article concluded that payment do not 
require commodification, however, shared responsibility is 
needed to provide and protect ecosystem services.  
Analysis of global PES schemes as part of our study, 
including our case studies showed that strict conditionality 
of PES mostly did not exist. Therefore, we recognized that 
in practice, conditionality of PES contracts is stratified 
ranging from ES contracts that link tangible benefits for the 
ES providers by the actual enhanced delivery of ES (level 
I), maintenance of agro-ecosystems in a desirable state 
(level II), performance agreed actions to enhance ES (level 
III), development and implementation of management 
plans to enhance ES with respect for local sovereignty in 
conserving the environment for both local and external 
benefits (level IV). This stratification contributes to 
bringing the theory of PES conditionality closer to practice 
(van Noordwijk and Leimona 2010).    
Based on these levels of conditionality and recognition 
of PES practices in Asia, we offer three distinct perspect-
ives of PES. Those are commoditization of ES, compen-
sation for opportunities skipped/forgone and co-investment 
in environmental stewardship. Commoditization of ES 
operates at conditionality level I with no explicit poverty 
targets. Compensation for opportunities skipped/ forgone is 
when land users are paid for accepting restrict-ions on their 
use of land and has conditionality at level II or III. Co-
investment in environmental stewardship is where PES 
contracts between ES providers and buyers are flexible 
with broad sanction and monitoring requirements. Mutual 
trust is strong. 
Our case studies also observed that there are 
opportunities for phased strategies. After creating, for 
example, a basis of respect and relationship through the co-
investment paradigm, there may be more space for specific 
follow-ups in the commoditization paradigm for actual 
delivery of ES to meet conservation and ES additional 
objectives, i.e. a PES scheme is additional whereas the 
scheme increases environmental services compared to 
baselines without a PES scheme.  
In order to be pro-poor, a PES has to adapt to the 
local conditions, including in designing types, forms 
and expected level of rewards  
The case studies of PES in Asia experienced shifting 
perspectives: from legitimating cost-efficient and effective 
natural resource management outcomes to concerns about 
fairness in design and benefit distribution of the scheme. 
Monetization and commoditization of ES through PES can 
create technical problems in addressing both efficiency and 
fairness outcomes; it also raises ethical arguments by 
obscuring cultural, political and social relationships in an 
environmental service generation (Kosoy and Corbera 
2010).  
We analyzed the contribution of actual cash for 
individual ES providers from beneficiaries to poverty 
alleviation and proved that such a design has to attentively 
consider some key ratios of relative numbers of service 
providers and beneficiaries, and their income per capita 
measures (Leimona et al. 2009). In this case, the analysis of 
income and spatial data on Indonesian agro-ecosystems 
indicated that a modest increased target of 5% of annual 
disposable income of upstream rural household may be 
difficult to be achieved given the population and income 
structure of downstream and upstream areas in Asia.  
Identifying rewards that match with people’s needs and 
expectations, is one particularly important aspect of pro-
poor RES approaches. The findings from focus group 
discussions at the different sites suggest that there is a 
substantial variation among communities concerning 
poverty concepts and reward preferences. This provides 
important insights into the various dimensions that well-
targeted reward schemes need to address. Our analysis 
concluded that rewards in the forms of human capital, 
social capital and physical capital – or what are often 
referred to as non-financial incentives – are very often the 
most preferred and possible types of rewards. Public social 
investments, such as education and health services (i.e. 
human capital), good road conditions (i.e. physical capital), 
security of land tenure, recognition as environmental 
champion and trust from government to maintain intact 
environment (i.e. social capital). In industrialized country, 
these public investment are part of government’s 
responsibility, however they are lacking in our case studies. 
These aspects combined with high social cohesion that 
defies the concept of free-rider (i.e. we don’t mind our 
neighbour enjoying our rewards from maintaining good ES 
and we prefer everybody is happy) support the preference 
of non-financial reward.     
Initial investment in achieving a shared under-
standing of multiple ecological knowledge in provid-
ing and managing ES increases efficiency and 
fairness of PES scheme  
One of the main problems of a PES scheme is that there are 
widely held assumptions between changes in land cover 
and environmental service (ES) provision. The proposed 
solutions of environmental problems, including decrease of 
ES provisions, are mostly based on the relative merits of 
reforestation emphasizing that ES is provided only by 
natural forest but not by other land uses. Furthermore, 
standardized solution to natural resource management 
refers to narrowly defined land-rehabilitation projects by, 
for example, planting trees and not considering other 
landscape management techniques, such as constructing 
simple sedimentation retainer along riparian zone.  
Payment for environmental services 
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In natural resource management, different stakeholders 
may in fact have opposite interests in utilizing a landscape. 
From the policy perspective, agroforestry-mosaic land-
scapes as found in many Asian countries, can offer great 
opportunity for combining economic and environment 
targets. In these landscapes, farmers combine elements of 
the natural forest that provide environmental services with 
trees for productive purposes and intensive food cropping 
systems (Van Noordwijk et al. 2002). Yet, potential ES 
buyers and policy makers in general sometimes fail 
recognizing these agroforestry systems. As the agricultural 
landscapes, for example, may not meet the legal definitions 
of “forest” or be in conflict with the existing land-use 
regulation system and policies – even though the land 
practices can provide some ES at similar level to forest 
ecosystems can.  
The appreciation of the various quantitative enviro-
nmental service indicators probably differs by stakeholder 
group. To ensure an established PES, we need to under-
stand these ES indicators from the perspective of  both 
upstream and downstream local communities, general 
public and policy makers, and ecological modeller or 
hydrologist – who are involved in a PES scheme (Farida et 
al. 2005; Jeanes et al. 2006). The multiple ecological 
knowledge approach applied in this study is to clarify 
expectations from all relevant actors, avoid unrealistic 
targets for the quality of watershed services, help define 
conditionality of RES and offer appropriate monitoring 
procedures. However, our case studies also showed that the 
availability of information is only a prerequisite for 
increasing the quality and sustainability of PES schemes. 
Interviews with practitioners in this study found that the 
factors influencing the design and implementation of PES 
programs are varied and beyond the availability of multi-
perception knowledge and scientific data. The issue of 
strategic use of information, a discrepancy between scale in 
the provision of environmental services and its investment, 
and the vested interests of intermediaries and donors deter 
the optimal use of such multiple knowledge analysis in 
designing and implementing rewards for watershed 
schemes. 
A sustainable livelihood framework enables broader 
analysis of local perspectives on PES by encompass-
ing various types of capitals 
Poverty, defined simply as inadequacy of income is still 
fairly common in the literature on human deprivation. 
However, this view has to capture the understanding that 
income influences people’s life style and in the end 
contributes to impoverishment of the lives they lead (Sen 
2000). The perspectives on poverty inescapably surpass the 
notion of welfare utility and encompass a broader range of 
capabilities (Kahneman et al. 1997; Sen 1999; Wegner and 
Pascual 2011), including the capabilities of pursuing 
individual happiness (Frey and Stutzer 2002). Therefore, 
increasing evidence and theory of plural dimensions of 
human well being (Wegner and Pascual 2011) support the 
perspective of multidimensional poverty in analysing local 
perspectives on PES outcomes.            
Our study on local perspectives on PES outcomes 
showed that benefits were mostly non-financial, including 
expanded social networks with external stakeholders, 
knowledge and capacity of the community and small-scale 
public infrastructure investments. Direct financial benefits 
were limited. We presume the non-financial benefits 
combined with recognition from the governments and 
external stakeholders can well increase farmers’ commit-
ment to the scheme. When financial payment is given, it is 
important to adjust the value of new contracts so the 
farmers can cover their true opportunity cost if the funds 
from the buyer allow that. However, findings in other PES 
sites in Asia revealed that most of the scheme cannot cover 
farmers’ true opportunity cost because of limited funds of 
buyers (Leimona et al. 2009).    
Although the PES scheme did not drastically change 
the livelihoods of participants, linkages with external 
stakeholders were creating opportunities for participants to 
diversify or capture greater value from their income 
sources. Our case study showed that exposure to these 
partners also increased the participants’ knowledge of 
conservation, their skills to manage a farmers’ organizat-
ion, and helped to build networks to improve their 
businesses and implementation of the PES scheme. It also 
highlights the need for awareness of the social dynamics 
between participants and non-participants and design 
benefit packages to minimize community level conflict.  
Literature on PES mentions that conditional monetary PES 
forming extrinsic motivation might crowd out intrinsic 
motivation of people to do something right for societies 
(Farley and Costanza 2010). Experiences from the 
behavioural economics and psychology fields show that 
even simple reminders to money made people perform 
independently and socially insensitively. Further, experi-
ments showed that people might commit more efforts in 
exchange for no payment, such as in a social market where 
reciprocity is expected, rather than they expend when they 
receive low payment, such as underpayment in a monetary 
market (Heyman and Ariely 2004; Ariely 2009).   
Conclusions  
This study aimed to contribute to the knowledge base on 
how to balance efficiency and fairness of PES schemes in 
Asia through analyses of several case studies. The main 
conclusions are summarised below. 
First, the empirical observations on emerging PES-
mechanisms in the Asian case studies indicate that the 
performance of PES to achieve and balance efficiency and 
fairness is strongly influenced by complex behaviour and 
decision making at the individual level. These behaviours 
at individual levels are not only limited to ES providers as 
the main actors of PES but also beneficiaries, inter-
mediaries, and supporters of PES (e.g. governments and 
international agents). Motivations of stakeholders, their 
perceptions, power relations and political interest towards 
PES can further shape the design and implementation of 
PES. A language of co-investment in environmental 
stewardship may be more conducive to the type of respect, 
mutual accountability and commitment to sustainable 
development that is desired. 
Second, non-financial payment has to be considered as 
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an important incentive for ES providers. Such payments 
have weaknesses, such as giving indirect benefits to ES 
providers, which reduces the effectiveness of the payment 
and can trigger free-riders and patronizing effects. 
Nevertheless, in-kind reward is often the most feasible 
transfer because the budget for PES from ES beneficiaries 
is typically small and cannot cover the full opportunity 
costs of the providers. Moreover, in-kind reward avoids 
neglecting non-participants and aligns with social cohesive-
ness characterizing rural communities in most developing 
countries. 
Third, the application of multiple ecological knowledge 
systems, i.e. local, public and scientific ecological know-
ledge can support the establishment of efficient and fair 
PES schemes. Clarifying problems in the provision of ES 
and recommending solutions at each spatial scale leads to 
more realistic expectations of all stakeholders in imple-
menting PES schemes. The roles of each actor are then 
well-recognized and solutions based on local contexts 
rather than standardized ones lead to mutual responsibility 
among PES actors.  
Fourth, the ES providers’ decision making process in 
joining and implementing a PES contract is influenced by 
social and institutional factors beyond monetary values. 
However, rural communities are open to a market-based 
approach, harnessing competitiveness among its partici-
pants as long as the design of the market-based instrument 
is transparent and does not make them worse-off.  
Fifth, evaluating an established PES using the 
sustainable livelihood framework can provide more 
complete insights on how PES makes actors involved better 
or worse-off. It also can more fairly evaluate project 
implementers, since a broader view of impacts are 
captured. Our case in Indonesia suggests that the role of the 
intermediary is very important and possibly dominant. An 
honest and trusted intermediary is thus one of the key 
factors to success of a PES scheme. It also highlights the 
need for awareness of the social dynamics between 
participants and non-participants and design benefit 
packages to minimize community level conflict.   
Finally, interdependency of fairness and efficiency is 
the main consideration in designing and implementing a 
PES scheme in developing countries. Neither fairness nor 
efficiency alone should be the primary aim but an 
intermediate PES that is fairly efficient and efficiently fair 
may bridge the gap to the practical implementations of PES 
on the ground.  
Synthesis and recommendations: integrating PES 
mechanisms into a wider concept of sustainable 
development 
As a relatively new concept, PES is facing challenges in its 
process of being adopted as an innovation. The initial 
theory of PES emphasized effectiveness of the scheme by 
maximizing ES provision in relation to the monetary value 
invested. In practice, PES often needs considering fairness 
aspects and respect for traditional practices of local 
communities. The difference between theory and imple-
mentation of PES schemes places this approach in 
balancing fairness and efficiency in PES designs and 
implementations in a critical light.  
Recognition of the range of PES approaches to provide 
incentives for enhancement of ES is needed rather than 
using “PES-like” terminology for partial matches with a 
theoretical framework. Such terminology may not reflect an 
optimal solution. A positive terminology for portraying 
PES in practices may avoid frustrations from practitioners, 
who might otherwise sense to be blamed for not meeting 
theoretical expectations.  
A broader view of efficiency can be achieved if all 
potential win-win exchanges across actors and capital types 
have been identified, negotiated and implemented. An ideal 
PES scheme, in the perception of the external stakeholders, 
can efficiently produce the desired effects or result in ES 
increments with a minimum expenditure of time, effort, 
skill or money across the negotiation and implementation 
phases. An ideal PES scheme from a local perspective 
provides substantial net benefits after all transaction and 
opportunity costs have been accounted for. While the 
minimum condition for local stakeholders is that the 
scheme at least does not make them worse-off socially and 
economically, and the minimum condition for external 
stakeholders is to break-even with alternative options to 
secure the ES they depend on. These different perceptions 
and expectations on distribution of costs and benefits 
among relevant stakeholders should be reflected at each 
stage of PES development. A pro-poor PES scheme is 
feasible under some conditions but not under others, 
depending on the degree of space-time association (rather 
than causal relationship) of poverty and environmental 
degradation. 
This study was limited to research sites that were 
selected from a larger set of candidates of PES implement-
ation sites in Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam with 
the main results coming from the Indonesian case studies. 
Thus, these sites may not necessarily represent the broader 
conditions of all PES schemes in Asia. Nevertheless, 
methodologically, this study contributes to the introduction 
of a nested approach and assessment of people’s perspect-
ive in identifying ES, PES supply costs, various types of ES 
rewards and livelihood outcomes of such schemes, and 
levelling expectations of all actors involved to avoid over 
expectations and perverse incentives. The study supports 
the argument to incorporate a more holistic livelihoods 
perspective in PES schemes and to combine efforts through 
moral persuasion, regulation and rewards or incentive 
approaches to modify local-resource-use decisions in the 
social, political and ecological realities of the Asian 
landscape.  
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